Who Was Vercingetorix?

Vercingetorix is a name that still holds power. A Gallic prince and a formidable war leader, virtually all that we know of him comes from his deadly adversary, Julius Caesar.

Run close to defeat by a stubborn Gallic foe, Caesar reveals a highly capable leader who deployed sophisticated strategies and tactics to resist the Roman conquest. But who Vercingetorix was as a man is difficult to gauge, and what Caesar’s true feelings towards him were is complex.

As potent to modern national folklore as Boudica (Britannia), Arminius (Germania), Viriathus (Iberia), Calgacus (Caledonia), Tueta (Illyria), or Jugurtha (Numidia), Vercingetorix, to this day, is an inspirational figure of ethnic national resistance.

Emerging in the later stages of the Gallic Wars (58-50 BCE), Vercingetorix was a pivotal figure in the Gallic resistance against Roman subjugation. Though Caesar’s war commentaries tell us little about the man, we gain just enough of a picture to see in Vercingetorix a highly capable figure, uniting the disparate Gauls, and instilling confidence, discipline, and vision in their struggle against Rome.

“Caesar by means of garrisons and bribes and levies of money and assessments of tribute humbled some [Gallic tribes] and tamed others.”
[Cassius Dio, Roman History, 40.41]

If Vercingetorix ever was aligned with the Romans, there are some parallels with Arminius — the Germanic war leader who lived and served with the Romans and who knew how they fought. However, this is highly speculative.

A powerful and prominent tribe, the Arverni had traditionally sought to project their influence throughout Gaul. Vercingetorix’s father Celtillus had been put to death when other tribes rejected his authority. The Arverni, like most tribes, were dominated by complex oligarchies made up of powerful clans and families.

The Gallic tribes that Caesar describes were in a state of constant political disunity both internally and externally. Conflict was common and the Arverni were the traditional enemies of the Aedui in particular — a regional rival that Caesar relied upon, and used as a justification for his intervention in Gaul.

The Romans wrote the book on “divide and conquer” tactics and in Gaul they had a perfect scenario. Gallic struggles had even seen Germanic tribes like the Suebi (under Ariovistus) coming south of the Rhine to exploit Gallic disunity.

Initially undertaking war to prevent a major migration of the Helvetti in 58 BCE, Caesar manipulated a well-established Roman trigger to justify a wider war that was useful to his own personal ambitions. Siding with prominent local allies such as the Aedui, Caesar would justify wars that took him all over northwest Europe, fighting various peoples including the Gauls, the Belgae, the Aquitani, the Britons, and various Germanic tribes.

Employing “mission creep” on an epic scale, Caesar’s military exploits included the reduction of distant tribes like the fierce Belgae, and sea battles on new oceans with maritime powers like the Veneti in 56 BCE. His unprecedented campaigns to the edge of the known world in mysterious Britain in 55 and 54 BCE, were legendary. As were his forays over the mighty Rhine in 55 and 53 BCE against “savage” Germanic enemies.

This “portfolio” of spectacular campaigns, including the subjugation of greater Gaul, had little to do with supporting regional allies or stabilizing the barbarian north. Even back in Rome, critics questioned the legality of Caesar’s wars.

Personal ambition was Caesar’s true driver. Although he was not the first Roman commander to act this way, the scale of his ambition was notable. In documenting his campaigns within his Gallic War commentaries — our key source — Caesar delivered a masterclass in political propaganda. Though his military achievements were all too real, their presentation was “spun.” All that we hear of Caesar’s glory comes from the pen (stylus) of Caesar himself.

Pursuit of personal power, immunity from domestic prosecution, and the amassing of financial, military, and political capital — these were Caesar’s true motives — and he would destroy entire cultures to achieve them. An utter calamity for the ethnic Celts of northern Europe (equated by some to genocide), the pursuit of Caesar’s ambition was insatiable.

Though centuries of Roman prejudice would belittle Gallic civilization, Celtic peoples were not backward. Quite the contrary, a wealth of historical and archaeological evidence testifies that Gaul was already on a deeply impressive arc of proto-urbanization with a rapidly developing economy and infrastructure.

In war, the Romans also derided the Gauls for being hot-headed, arrogant, and poorly disciplined. Rome had certainly defeated Gallic tribes on many occasions, and the first years of the Gallic Wars would largely follow that trend. A warrior (Gallic) vs military (Roman) clash of cultures highlighted a perhaps inevitable disparity, with the Gauls suffering something of a deficit in war strategy, tactics, and technology. The disparate and disjointed nature of tribal politics did nothing to help the Gauls.

Though roughly tested by the fearsome Belgae in 57 BCE, most battles against the “barbarians” signaled an inability of Caesar’s tribal enemies to go head-to-head with Roman arms. Where the tribes retired to their formidable, fortified towns (oppida), Roman siege technology was all but unstoppable.

However, rooted deep within the Roman psyche lay a surprising contradiction. In certain scenarios, the Romans feared the Gauls; History demonstrated that the tribes could be highly dangerous. Something of an encoded “Gallic terror,” was attached to mass tribal incursions and especially to a time when the Gauls nearly wiped a young Rome off the map (c.390 BCE).

Though deemed culturally and militarily “inferior,” Roman trauma was ingrained, and a grudging awe endured even in Caesar’s time due to the sheer size, physicality, and martial  ferocity of their “barbarian” adversaries. The Gauls were not without game and were more dangerous still if they could harness the right strategy, tactics, and leadership.

Burdened by the imposition of the legions, several Gallic tribes despaired of the Roman occupation. An unsuccessful revolt by Ambiorix and the Eburones in 54/53 BCE, was brutally repressed. This only fed wider Gallic resentment.

By 52 BCE, powerful tribes like Vercingetorix’s Arvenri held only reluctant loyalty to the Romans. With the mood on a knife edge, Vercingetorix himself was expelled from his capital Gergovia as he sought to encourage his fellow tribesmen to revolt. Yet, powerful nobles like Vercingetorix’s uncle Gobanitio feared Caesar’s wrath.

Appealing widely to common warriors, Vercingetorix raised an army to retake his capital. Now in control of his people, the call went out to other Gallic tribes. The Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemovice, and many groups bordering the ocean were the first to join. A truly pan-Gallic rebellion would soon follow.

Caesar, who was out of the province at the time, emphasizes that the rebellion was driven by brutality and intimidation. Though possibly true, it would be naïve to think that some of the Pro Roman figures ousted were not already compromised by the Caesar.

Hostages were taken between the tribes, but this highlights the fractious culture that had always existed in pan-Gallic society. With the sheer speed and numbers involved in the revolt, it is hard to see the rebellion as anything other than a “popular” uprising. At a great council, the tribes declared a fight for common liberty. If not quite nationhood, this was the closest that Celtic Gaul would ever come to it.

Voted as king and supreme leader, Vercingetorix was now at the head of a mass coalition of warriors. Never had the Gallic tribes united in such a way, never had their very survival been so critically threatened. Caesar, who had largely dictated the focus of his campaigns thus far, would now lose the initiative, and be tested to the limit of his abilities.

Returning in winter, Caesar marched to meet the rebellion. Seizing sites at Vellaunodunum and Genabum, the Romans sought to secure critical centers of provision. In doing so they forced the Gauls into a battle at Noviodunum, and beat them. Largely unable to face the might of the legions in the field, tribal strategy needed to adapt.

Unlike their Celtic kin the Britons, the Gauls had abandoned traditional war chariots and fought on foot and horse. Their cavalry was particularly strong, and, in this arm, they outnumbered Caesar’s forces by some margin. The Roman general, irresistible in the strength of his infantry, was required to rely on far smaller contingents of Gallic allies and Germanic mercenary horsemen. In this sphere, Vercingetorix would seek to press his advantage.

Relying on his cavalry, Vercingetorix undertook a deliberate “scorched earth” policy, convincing the tribes to gather their supplies and destroy outlying provisions. Torching many settlements, their women, children, and cattle were taken into the forests. This was the most desperate form of defense imaginable for an agrarian tribal society. Only key centers would be defended, with the Romans compelled to roam for supplies in a land stripped of resources.

Using their advantage in mobile cavalry, the Gauls set about harrying Roman communications and supplies. Shadowing and isolating Roman forces as they dispersed to forage, the tribes shunned major battles.

A new resolve became evident, with Vercingetorix instilling a degree of discipline into the previously reckless and disjointed tribes. Though Caesar attributed much of the chieftain’s control to violent barbarism, this took no account of the popular leadership and strength of character that Vercingetorix must have employed to hold his coalition together.

Roman deserters were noted as the deprivations of the drastic Gallic strategy started to have an effect. Yet, we know that “scorched earth” also caused huge anguish within the tribes, and Vercingetorix was forced to defend his policy as the burden of war inevitably fell heavily on tribes within the immediate theater of conflict.

A sophisticated strategy for the Gauls, this new selfless collectivism required discipline and tenacity. The well-established Roman trope of disjointed, ill-disciplined tribesmen was evaporating under the leadership of Vercingetorix.

Obliged to defend the major center of Avaricum (modern Bourges) when the Bituriges begged for support, Vercingetorix could not afford to be caught within the town. Despatching 10,000 defenders while staying mobile with an external force, the Gallic chief sought to frustrate Roman siege operations.

Early counter operations, saw Vercingetorix draw up his army:

“On this hill the Gaul’s were established, with all confidence in the position; distributed according to their several nationalities, they held every ford and thicket by the marsh … So anyone who remarked how near they were thought them prepared to fight to a finish in almost equal battle; but anyone who observed the inequality of the positions recognised that they were displaying themselves in empty bravado. The troops were furious …”
[Caesar, Gallic Wars 7.19]

Here was a new prospect. A “barbarian” army in a well-ordered array and on well-chosen ground, inviting the Romans into a strategic mistake. The Gauls were learning, and Caesar declined an unfavorable opportunity for battle.

Avaricum was bitterly contested, with both sides showing bitter determination and grim ingenuity. Desperate for supplies, the Romans constructed two massive towers on ramps to overcome the mighty walls. Undertaking sophisticated countermeasures, the Gauls improvised higher towers and mined the Roman ramps, tunneling underneath Caesar’s works to destabilize them. Already skilled in metal mining, these “backward” tribesmen showed a military capability surprising to the Romans.

Fighting day and night, the Gauls struggled to counter the relentless attrition of a Roman siege, though their bravery was without question:

“…  [a Gaul] who was casting into the fire opposite the [Roman] turret tallow and fire …, was pierced with a dart on the right side and fell dead. One of those next him stepped over him as he lay, and discharged the same task: when the second man was slain by a wound from a crossbow, a third succeeded him, and a fourth succeeded the third …”
[Caesar, Gallic Wars, 7.25]

Avaricum would eventually fall. Most of its 40,000 defenders were massacred without mercy.

Gergovia 

With war switching to the Arverni capital Gergovia, the fight was soon on to save Vercingetorix’s center of tribal power. During the early stages of positional fighting the Romans secured key ground, and for a while, it seemed that their stranglehold over the great fortress was inevitable. However, when Caesar learned that his key allies, the Aedui (a major Gallic tribe still loyal to Rome) had rebelled, he was compelled to depart the field to put down a coup. Though he did this quickly, it was a significant setback and may have affected Roman confidence.

With order forcibly restored among the Aedui, and Caesar back in the field, positional fighting resumed. However, a misunderstanding between the Romans and their now loyal Aedui cavalry — whom the Romans mistook for an enemy formation — created chaos in the legionary ranks.

A critically timed charge by Vercingetorix and his cavalry broke Roman ranks and put the legions to flight. No less than 46 centurions and up to 700 legionaries were lost, though these numbers seem suspiciously low for what followed. Only a critical intervention by the reserve under Titus Sextius prevented a complete Roman collapse.

Compelled to break off strategic operations completely, Caesar was at pains to downplay a rare defeat. The Gauls had defeated the legions. Caesar was checked at Gergovia.

Culminating in a titanic showdown, the war would shift to another major siege, this time at Alesia. An all-out struggle for victory, this centered upon another major hilltop fortress that the exhausted Gauls sought to hold. For the Romans, this was now a concerted effort to extinguish a revolt that was proving all too dangerous and costly. Both Vercingetorix and Caesar would risk everything at Alesia.

After the defeat of the cavalry who had pursued the retiring legions at Gergovia, the Gauls were exhausted. Allowing themselves to be caught at Alesia, Vercingetorix made a huge strategic error. Masters in the art of the siege, Caesar pounced at the opportunity to “bottle up” the Gallic chieftain and his 80,000 tribesmen.

With the Romans undertaking extensive defensive works to ensure contravallation of the entire site, one of history’s greatest sieges was underway. As the extensive Roman earthworks went up — stretching up to eleven miles — Vercingetorix sent out a call for fresh Gallic forces to come to his aid. Quite conscious of his predicament, it is likely that the Gallic Chieftain consciously sought to use himself as bait to smash the Romans.

Recognizing the threat, Caesar had his men build a second, outward-facing line of defensive works (circumvallation). Consisting of major redoubts, trenches, mounds, palisades, and towers, Roman field works were extensive and formidable. Built while under harrying attack by the Gauls, this chillingly signified the true power of Roman warfare. Defended by sharpened stakes and lilia (booby-traps), the double-lined works allowed the legions to maximize their stranglehold, distributing troops to reactively resist attacks from inside and out.

The Romans now sought to starve Vercingetorix’s Gauls into submission. Desperate, the Gauls sent out their women, children, sick, and elderly:

“When these came to the Roman fortifications, weeping, they begged of the soldiers by every entreaty to receive them as slaves and relieve them with food. But Caesar, placing guards on the rampart, forbade them to be admitted.”
[Caesar Gallic Wars, 7.78]

Caesar afforded no mercy and even non-combatants were destined to perish. In the final stages of the fighting a massive Gallic relief force, numbering up to 250,000 men (the actual numbers are problematic), sought to swarm the outer defenses while Vercingetorix’s forces within made concerted sallies to break out. With up to ten or eleven legions (perhaps 50,000 men), the Romans were pressed by desperate day and night attacks. The Gauls flung themselves at the Roman defenses with near-suicidal bravery. Though under critical pressure, the Roman defenses did not break.

Fighting would continue in the years that followed, though the true strength of Gaul was broken forever at Alesia. Conducting a last council of the tribes, Vercingetorix offered his life to his fellow tribesmen, either in atonement for his failure, or to be surrendered to the Romans in a selfless act of appeasement. In seeking terms, the broken Gauls were compelled to give up all their leaders. The defenders were taken into slavery.

In one of the most iconic scenes from ancient history, Vercingetorix surrendered to the Roman commander. Though Caesar makes little of the event, Dio paints a memorable picture:

“[Vercingetorix] came to him without any announcement by herald, but appeared before him suddenly, as Caesar was seated on the tribunal, and threw some who were present into alarm; for he was very tall to begin with, and in his armour, he made an extremely imposing figure. When quiet had been restored, he uttered not a word, but fell upon his knees, with hands clasped in an attitude of supplication.”
[Dio, Roman History, XL,41]

Dio recorded that Caesar was unmoved and resentful of the broken loyalty he perceived in an old ally. Famously cultivating clemency in the Roman Civil Wars, Caesar showed no sentimentality towards his Gallic adversary. Held in captivity until 46 BCE, the fate of the Gallic warrior king was to be paraded in a Triumph before his eventual execution. Probably garrotted in the Roman capital, this was the true Roman way, pitiless and without sentiment.

Vercingetorix’s Legacy

In Caesar’s commentaries, Vercingetorix is discernible as a brave, clever, and strong character. Yet, the Roman gives us little detail about the man himself. Of course, Caesar may not have known more, but it is also probable that he may not have cared, and nor would his audience. Barbarians were one-dimensional figures; it was necessary only to highlight Roman achievements.

In Caesar we have a commentator who discounts the ability of his adversary as benefiting from fluke, barbarity, and low “native cunning.” Much of the military ingenuity of the Gauls was seen as mimicking Rome, with little credit afforded to the “natives.”

If we take a fairer view of Vercingetorix’s achievements, we can say that he achieved much. The organization of a great coalition of rival Gallic tribes was unprecedented and must have required formidable political ability, leadership, and strength of character. Vercingetorix implemented a sustained war strategy, with clever tactics that truly stretched the Romans and resulted in at least one significant victory.

Vercingetorix’s legacy is also profound. Nationalism has always picked at the bones of history. Epic victories are proudly celebrated, but epic resistance, even in defeat, can be just as powerful.

Heavily mythologized by later generations, Vercingetorix is a talisman of French national pride, preceding Joan of Arc by many centuries. As a leader, a warrior, and a unifier of “national” resistance, the Gallic leader stands as a martyr for a nation not conceptualized until well after his passing.

The defeat of Vercingetorix also marked a deeper tragedy. With him went the last free Celts of northwest Europe. Romanize or die — an entire civilization expunged. A silent irony was that Caesar — a literal destroyer of worlds — would leverage Gallic capital (via reputation, experience, gold, hardened legionaries, and ethnic auxiliaries) to destroy the Republic itself.